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1 
 
Bruno Latour and Rachel Carson are allies across the span of thirty 
years.  I think that the allegiance is a fact of major importance for a 
number of reasons, not the least of which is that it allows us to get 
Latour down to earth, where he can do us some good, and out of 
the realm of mannered high-cultural debate, where he is rendered 
as useless as the rest of his fellow debaters. 
 
 
2 
 
I have the advantage of access to a mediating discourse that makes 
the link between Latour and Carson particularly easy.  For a 
number of years I have been privileged to be tolerated by the 
biologists and software developers of BioQUEST as a resident alien 
– a Klingon amongst the humans, as it were.  BioQUEST is a 
pioneering consortium dedicated to the development of 
pedagogical software in biology.1  Very early on they realized that 
the computer offered opportunities for enriching biology teaching, 
both by offering simulated access to the world of real research and 
by enabling an interactive, collegial relationship between teachers 
and students. 
 
 
3 
 
Their software, therefore, is embedded in a deep and well thought 
out philosophy of education.  It is developed to fit what they call 
“the 3P’s,” problem posing, problem solving, and persuasion.  The 
3P’s structure and inform the classroom as a scene of genuine 
investigative activity engaged in cooperatively by teacher and 
students, from the decision about what to investigate to the 
presentation and defense of results.  They seek to instill the idea of 
science as an egalitarian cooperative activity, and nothing that fails 
to promote that conception finds its way into their product. 
 
 
4 
 
The rise to prominence of social studies of science in the last 
decade has been of great interest to BioQUEST.  There is an 
obvious community of interest between BioQUEST, with its 
emphasis on the social dimensions of scientific pedagogy, and 
intellectual movements trying to understand the social dimensions 
of science in general.  In particular, BioQUEST became intrigued 
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with the “constructivist” theories of Bruno Latour.2 
 
5 
 
As I said before, a big advantage in talking about Latour in the 
context of his relevance to BioQUEST is that it allows us to situate 
Latour properly.  Most of the discussion of Latour's work has taken 
place either in a discursive space inherited from rationalist 
metaphysics and philosophy of science, or within the confines of a 
still cryptopositivised social science.  BioQUEST has long since 
turned its back on the first, and is blissfully indifferent to the 
second.  They read Latour with a delightfully Latourian agenda – 
they seek to recruit him as an ally.  In addition, they fairly actively 
construct the Latour they seek to recruit.  Fair is fair, after all.  My 
view is the BioQUEST construction of Latour is closer to being in 
his own terms than the readings of most other commentators and 
critics. 
 
 
6 
 
BioQUEST’s science is, as we’ve seen, a science constantly in the 
making.  They take Latour’s science to be the same.  The emphasis 
on science in process, so deeply contrasted with the rationalist 
emphasis on completed or idealized science, is the core of 
BioQUEST’s Latour.  Thus the Janus figures that pepper Science in 
Action circulated widely inside BioQUEST just after the 
appearance of the book.  As Latour shows us a science in process, 
full of discussion, negotiation, recruitment of allies (both among 
human colleagues and among the “phenomena” under 
investigation), to BioQUEST he seems to be showing us science as 
a generalized classroom, everywhere full of the hustle and bustle of 
active cooperative learning.  This is a Latour brought down to 
earth as the guide to proper scientific learning. 
 
 
7 
 
In thinking about the BioQUEST version of Latour in relation to 
other versions, it's vitally important to think about the cultural 
and/or intellectual spaces being occupied by the various networks 
within which Latour circulates, and by the various nodes in the 
networks.  Primarily there is the network that constitutes the 
context in which, say, “modernism” and “postmodernism” have 
become epithets of common coin.  The participants in this network 
are located exclusively in the high-cultural regions of 
cultural/intellectual space – literature, philosophy, the arts:  in 
short, just those areas that have, in the two-culture system, been 
marginalized as “the humanities.”  This is the network of 
epistemetaphysical debate about subject/object, 
realism/antirealism, nature/society, and so on; a network still 
dominated by what Latour calls “The Great Divide.” 
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8 
 
The recent rise of historicosociological studies of science within the 
context of “culture studies” seemed a godsend, as it were, for these 
marginalized disciplines.  It looked (briefly) to the “humanities” as 
if, after years of decline in contrast with the sciences and social 
studies, they could be intellectual kings of the hill once again.  
(History as a discipline is plural enough to occupy a number of 
different positions on the fractal boundary between the humanities 
and the social sciences).  Alas it turns out that the marginalized 
disciplines could regain an ascendancy within the intellectual 
debates concerning the sciences only by marginalizing the 
intellectual debates themselves.  Yet, in the process of rarifying the 
debate for survival in their own preferred mix of gases, they, 
among other things, have set the terms of the most extensive 
discussions of Latour.  He, in turn, has ratified the rarefication by 
pausing to write We Have Never Been Modern.3  While there are 
continuities between it and the previous books, and even more 
continuities between it and some of his previous papers, there are 
also discontinuities of tone and tenor that signal its place in the 
high-cultural discursive space – ironically (?) a move into a space 
whose very existence he laments in the course of the 
move.  WHNBM is thus a dialectical intervention in the 
marginalized high-cultural debate.  While carried out in high-
cultural terms, it provides a critical (and accusatory) account of the 
social marginalization inherent in the adoption of those very 
terms.  The resulting ironies themselves then become a major 
rhetorical framework.  Latour has to become part of a network in 
which the nodes are tuned in a particular way precisely in order to 
try to retune the nodes. 
 
 
9 
 
Meanwhile BioQUEST has no intrinsic place in this high-cultural 
network.  However, they are deeply concerned with the problem of 
the two cultures, and want to contribute to their unification.  So 
they omnivorously attempt to tune themselves to the marginalized 
high-cultural network.  In fact, they move into the high-cultural 
space without a fully articulated sense that they are moving into an 
“alien” space when they do so.  For BioQUEST has no real sense of 
discursive spaces of this sort.  On the one hand, their view of 
discursive spaces comes from a consideration of subfields within 
the sciences, so their assumption is that crossing into the high-
cultural space is like moving from, say, biophysics to cytology.  
New truths of a new field have to be learned, but the rules of the 
discursive game are fundamentally the same in both fields.  
Further, of course, it is BioQUEST’s view that there shouldn’t be 
hard edges drawn through the space of intellectual life between its 
“parts.”  The edges between subdisciplines are difficult, but they’re 
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soft edges, often overstated for the sake of one or another turf 
battle.  So why shouldn’t they be able to follow Latour anywhere he 
wants to go, moving across soft edges and learning along the way 
what there is to be learned? 
 
10 
 
Furthermore BioQUEST has never lost its connection with the 
homely ideals of traditional American public education.  They 
naturally assume, perhaps totally anachronisticly, that the 
traditional productions of high culture – great literature and great 
art – are everyone’s rightful patrimony, accessible to all as a matter 
of pleasure and edification.  A wonderful teacher somewhere along 
the way (we all had one) told them so.  What this teacher didn’t tell 
them was that populating the upper reaches of intellectual life 
were people busy appropriating great art and great literature as the 
private preserve of a rarified discourse designed solely to 
distinguish them as scholars and intellectuals.  Consequently 
BioQUEST misestimates the terms of entry into networks such as 
the high-cultural network within which the Latourian message 
currently circulates, even as they become increasingly aware of 
(and increasingly frustrated with) the academic discourse of high 
culture. 
 
 
11 
 
Latour is, in contrast, a European intellectual, comfortable in the 
white tie and tails of sophisticated high-cultural badinage.  Despite 
this difference he is, in fact, a big help in allowing BioQUEST to 
have their more down-to-earth view of his work and its 
fundamental import.  He is, after all, in common cause with 
BioQUEST in a lot of ways.  He too thinks that the project of 
“modernism,” the project that’s responsible for the discursive 
geography of the two cultures BioQUEST is fretting against, is a 
disaster.  Indeed the pivot point of the critique is the same for 
both. Latour would identify this pivot point as the a priori dualism 
(“The Great Divide”) that forces into existence hybrid objects, that 
is, objects that have no legitimate home in the ontology of 
“modernism.” 
 
 
12 
 
Among the loci of typical hybrids, according to Latour, are “the 
chemistry of the upper atmosphere, scientific and industrial 
strategies, the preoccupations of heads of state, the anxieties of 
ecologists” (WHNBM, p.10).  Hybrids abound at those loci for 
obvious reasons:  there is no way to assign them cleanly either to a 
“nature” purified of human or societal intervention, or to the 
“mind,” thought of either in the Cartesian or the Hegelian sense.  
BioQUEST has no trouble recognizing the existence and import of 
these hybrids, not because they’ve read Hegel or some other effort 
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at high-cultural synthesis, but because they’ve read Rachel 
Carson.  For BioQUEST, it is second nature to think of Latourian 
hybrids as the loci of (very often problematic) interconnection of 
biologist, society, and nature.  Indeed it’s not difficult for 
BioQUEST to see the hybrids as the objects with the real 
ontological priority – just as Latour does. 
 
13 
 
Here we have located an important opposition, that between 
Cartesianism and Carsonianism, and must pause long enough to 
see exactly where the battle lines are drawn.  The ontology of 
Cartesianism is Christian; the ontology of Carsonianism is Pagan.4  
What Latour calls the “crossed out God” of modernism is the 
aufgehoben Neoplatonic God enforcing the dualistic ontology 
within pseudosecularized rationalism.  For the Carsonian, the 
fundamental ontology is a battleground contested by forces of 
good and evil in great plurality.5  These forces are nearly all 
Latourian hybrids.  The best examples are “disease” and “health,” 
both complex interactive, “interpenetrative” phenomena that can’t 
be ontologically reduced to “natural” and “social” components, 
but, of course, can be heuristically dismantled in the search for 
strategies and battle plans.  These strategies and battle plans are 
praxical and, in general, utterly disrespectful of the great divide. 
 
 
14 
 
The high-cultural readings of Latour nearly always paint him as 
threatening the disablement of science.  BioQUEST knows better.  
Latour surely does threaten the mythic construction of science 
whose power would rest on the possibility of its rational 
totalization in detachment from the contingencies of process.  But 
in marked contrast, Carsonians find Latour’s theory to be a 
message of liberation and empowerment for science in process.  
Thus BioQUEST reads Latour from the point of view of committed 
enthusiastic scientists, confident of the success of their activity, 
whereas the gloomy readers of Latour share metaphysical and/or 
theological agenda that are the real object of Latour’s threat. 
 
 
15 
 
Similarly, and with a good deal of textual justice, BioQUEST 
constructs a Latour who is radically egalitarian, and even 
iconoclastic.  This Latour would replace many of the hierarchical 
rationalist myths with a flat playing field where investigator and 
investigated interact with something approaching equal dignity.  
This is exactly parallel, of course, to the replacement of the 
hierarchical relationship of teacher and student with a more 
egalitarian collegiality. 
 
 16  Thus Latour’s Cartesian critics (and defenders, for that matter)  
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come to his work from the point of view of epistemological ideals, 
whereas BioQUEST and other Carsonians come to it with 
fundamental social ideals.  An epistemology, for BioQUEST, must 
be a guide to improved learning in the service of life as a whole, not 
a rarified ideal in itself.6  In general, the Carsonians approach the 
edge of the high-cultural debate offering simultaneously (a) a 
challenge to rationalist conceptions of science that can’t be ignored 
because of its topical practicality, (b) a demonstration of the ease 
with which Latour is recruited to the Carsonian view,7 (c) an 
invitation to recruit a past (Nightingale, Pasteur, Snow, Martineau, 
Semmelweis, George Eliot) shared by the entrenched science and 
the marginalized humanities (the two cultures of modernism), and 
consequently (d) a way to bring into question the intellectual and 
institutional trajectories of both cultures. 
 
17 
 
In short, the claim is that the battle Latour is fighting in the high-
cultural discourse of WHNBM is the mirror image of the battle 
that is being fought, and has been fought for over a century (at the 
very least), by the Carsonians and their predecessors against the 
Cartesians.  And, as Latour and BioQUEST well know, this battle 
does not really divide the contending parties on modernist lines.  
Neither does it divide them along the line separating the two 
cultures.  In fact, among the main antagonists for Carsonian 
scientists are other scientists (and the politics that support them).  
The defenders of the isolated bureaucracy of science, conceiving 
themselves as the neutral and innocent purveyors of neutral and 
innocent science are the natural (as it were) foes of the Carsonians. 
 
 
18 
 
BioQUEST, as the educational arm of the Carsonians, takes aim at 
one of the roots of this foe’s power when it proposes to educate 
young scientists to understand that they are not going to end up as 
neutral innocents.  Latour attacks the other root when he 
dismantles the claims of timeless universal reason on which the 
claims of neutrality and innocence (“purity,” in his terms) rest.  Of 
course the two roots are connected, and so are the two attacks.  
The point where the two attacks meet is called, by the rationalist 
orthodoxy, “constructivism.” 
 
 
19 
 
The final points to be made about BioQUEST’s Latour are to 
connect it with feminism, gender studies, and “postcolonialism,” 
all sites of important allegiances in the network of Carsonian 
Science.  Latour would be no more surprised to find himself 
connected to feminism than BioQUEST would be to find itself 
connected to postcolonialism.  Both would be perfectly happy with 
the respective association even though they so far have had little 
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specific to say about it.  The other two associations, BioQUEST 
with feminism and Latour with postcolonialism are, in contrast 
specific and long-standing.  We needn't look at the feminist 
connections of BioQUEST in detail here.  The last third of 
WHNBM shows us clearly that the colonial asymmetries are at the 
core of Latour's critique of rationalist science.  But we could have 
seen that through a prescient reading of The Pasteurization of 
France in any case. 
 
20 
 
Here as elsewhere BioQUEST and Latour meet as the former move 
from very and local concerns to more “global” ones and Latour 
works his way to a very concrete analysis from a relatively 
theoretical starting point.  BioQUEST started by noticing an 
entrenched practice, male-dominated hierarchically structured 
pedagogy.  They noticed how women fare in this practice, and 
realized that if they succeeded in installing a new pedagogy that 
dismantled the teacher/student asymmetry, they’d ipso facto have 
furthered the feminist agenda of equality.  This turned their 
attention explicitly to the critical discourse of feminism, a natural 
ally.  Here they found the vocabularies of empowerment and 
alterity.  These vocabularies then entered the BioQUEST self-
conception, and began to be used in the critical production of the 
pedagogical tools themselves.8  But alterity isn’t a concept whose 
critical power can be stopped at the boundaries of gender 
issues.  Furthermore we must remember once again, BioQUEST 
does Carsonian biology.  The Green Revolution, AIDS in central 
Africa, and so forth were always part of their normal core agenda.   
So in Latourian fashion, the network of alterities grew quite 
naturally for BioQUEST.  Their old agenda easily became partly 
reconstituted under the rubric of neocolonialism.  Thus it was very 
simple for Latour to lead them into the realm of global postcolonial 
concerns.  BioQUEST has already been there in practice for some 
time. 
 
 
21 
 
At the same time, Latour has managed to wend his way to the very 
practical solution to the “problem of cultural relativism” we find at 
the end of WHNBM.  As colonialism in its traditional political form 
is dismantled, and when the “others,” the ex-colonized are 
included in the network, one of three things can happen.  They can 
be purified as a condition for inclusion, whereupon the problem of 
cultural relativism is ipso facto solved by conversion.  They can be 
colonized in the classic repressive ways, whereupon the problem of 
cultural relativism is solved by obliterating all but one culture.  Or 
the others can (or must) be allowed entry into an international 
network on something like symmetrical cultural terms, in which 
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case a long process of network expansion, retuning of nodes, 
negotiation of self-conception, and other social change begins – to 
end we-know-not-where. 
 
22 
 
But this last was always the Carsonian agenda – from a practical 
point of view.  Or is it that this latter was always the Carsonian 
point of view, on the basis of practical agenda?  Either will do, as 
long as the primacy of the praxical isn't obscured.  Silent Spring 
was an early call for awareness of the environment as the locus of 
global concern, hence potential cooperation.  It was also, of course, 
one of the early articulations of the responsibility of the colonial 
nations for the environmental problems of the colonized nations.9 
 Nothing could be more practical.  Nothing could be thicker with 
hybrid objects. 
 
 
23 
 
In summary, there are all sorts of points that could be drawn from 
the relationship between the Latourian and Carsonian projects.  I 
choose to emphasize the issues of praxis and the (excuse the 
expression) reality of hybrid objects.  Whatever DDT may be from 
the point of view of the metaphysical high culture, from the 
Carsonian point of view it’s a chemical that gets into the food web 
and kills.  That’s as real as the Carsonians ever required DDT to be 
in order for it to be worth their attention.  The Carsonians are 
plenty sophisticated enough to know how the reality of DDT was 
woven into a web of scientific, economic, and political practices all 
over the globe.  That web itself is real enough for the Carsonians:  a 
real condition of their scientific, economic and political activity. 
 
 
24 
 
For BioQUEST, Carsonians of the classroom, all these realities are 
palpable quotidian ones. But they think that the realities go even 
deeper.  If they were to adhere to the “Modern” constitution and its 
insistence on the “Great Divide” then they would have to think of 
those who do their labs and take their exams as hybrid objects in 
the process of construction.  They prefer to think of them as their 
students and participants in the collegial Carsonian project of 
science.  Now is BioQUEST, in the name of intellectual 
responsibility, perhaps, to be asked to revise their ontological 
commitments?  Or, to put it in a more Foucaultian voice, do the 
knowledges of the metaphysical high culture have the power to 
discipline BioQUEST to an orthodox modernism?  Don’t be 
silly.  The metaphysical high culture has no such power. 
 
 
25 
 
Powerlessness:  that’s the problem – for the high culture, that is, 
not for the Carsonians.  Intellectual high culture is absolutely 
irrelevant to DDT, HIV, halide aerosols, and the rest.  Its acute  
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feeling of irrelevance is a good part of what motivates it to its 
current ritual exorcisms of science.  In contrast, the Carsonians 
know perfectly well where the power lies.  It lies in the “hybrid 
objects” of science, economy, and politics – just as Latour says it 
does.  BioQUEST sees this more clearly than most, for they have to 
put forward their educational ideals, programs, software in the 
face of a politics of science and a politics of education that is more 
often than not hostile to them.  In the context of their own work, 
they come up against the modern constitution as the ideological 
smokescreen behind which many scientists hide (on grounds of 
neutrality and objectivity), and with which those for whom 
Carsonian science is uncomfortable try to keep it at bay. 
 
26 
 
It becomes obvious, then, why Latour is an attractive ally for 
BioQUEST.  They use his conception of constructivist science to 
cut through the modernist ideology that threatens to seal them off 
from the hybrid world where all the action is.  The claim that we 
have never been modern looks, to BioQUEST, like the common-
sensical claim that science has never made much sense outside the 
rich multidimensional network of human life that is, in turn, the 
network of interactions with all events and processes however 
parsed.  They are together with Latour in reacting against the 
ideology that claims otherwise.  They consider it outrageously 
irresponsible to teach their students otherwise.  In addition, as we 
have seen, Carsonians are more than comfortable with the projects 
of feminism and anticolonialism that lie at the base of Latour’s 
insistence on dismantling the imperialist asymmetries implicit in 
modernism.  From that point of view, Latour fits into one of the 
longest of Carsonian traditions. 
 
 
27 
 
But finally, then, what about the problem of the two cultures, since 
BioQUEST seems to want to overcome that dichotomy, but 
apparently turns its back on the high culture.  Well, in general, this 
is a longish story for another time.  But the short way to put it is 
that BioQUEST consists of terrific learners as well as terrific 
teachers.  They worry that the apostles of high culture seem to be 
neither.  BioQUEST thinks that there is only one responsible way 
to dismantle that asymmetry. 
 
 
 
 
© Chuck Dyke, 2001 
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Notes 
 
 
 
1     Science, November 4, 1994 honored John Jungck, the 
“godfather” of pedagogical software, and one of the founders of 
BioQUEST in its section on great teachers.  In addition to Jungck, 
the identifiable core of BioQUEST contains Patty Soderberg, Jim 
Stewart, and Nils Peterson.  The circle then widens to developers, 
consultants, programmers, editors, etc. 
 
 
 
 
2     The most influential of Latour’s works for BioQUEST, for 
reasons of trajectory convergence at a particular time, is Bruno 
Latour and Steve Woolgar, Laboratory Life, Princeton, NJ, 
Princeton University Press, 1986.  Subsequently Latour, Science in 
Action, Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 1987 has been 
folded into the batter. 
 
 
 
 
3     Bruno Latour, We Have Never Been Modern, Catherine Porter, 
tr., Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1993.  An exactly similar 
pause resulted in Michel Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge 
and The Discourse on Language, A. M. Sheridan-Smith, tr., New 
York, Random House, (1969 and 1970), 1972.   There’s a necessity 
to both the pauses, having to do with the dynamics of the high-
cultural debate, readerships, etc.  I won’t go into the issues here. 
 
 
 
 
4     BioQUEST does, however, inherit strategies, styles, and 
rhetorics from Christianity, especially the deeply embedded 
American evangelical Christianity.  This is discussed in its place.  
 
 
 
5     Or, at least, in great plurality now that the convenient 
juxtaposition of socialism against capitalism is impossible.  
 
 
 
6     This is not to say that a life of learning can’t be an ideal; but 
that’s an entirely different story.  
 
 
 
7     When we recall that the book that drew everyone’s attention to 
Latour was The Pasteurization of France, Alan Sheridan and John 
Law, trs., Cambridge, MA, Harvard Univdersity Press, 1988, it’s 
hard to see how we could have lost sight of Latour’s Carsonian 
foundations.  If anything, this early book was an account of an 
agon within a Carsonian framework. 
 
 
 
 
8     Not surprisingly, given the rural Midwest base of BioQUEST, 
race is never anything like the focus that gender is for them.  The 
expansion of BioQUEST into other frames, at test sites etc., helped 
to add this dimension over time.  Here again BioQUEST had never 
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been blind to racial asymmetries (any number of people in and 
near the core of BioQUEST had been active in civil rights 
movements), they just never had impinged as quotidian concerns 
in the very practical classroom experience that was generating the 
BioQUEST projects. 
 
 
 
9     BioQUEST itself was also influenced by Richard Levins’ call for 
a democratic endogenous science in the colonized nations.  
                        
      
